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8 April 1966

UNITED STATES OF EUROPE, DREAM OR POSSIBILITY?

By

JUN 29 1966

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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SUMMARY

"United States of Europe, Dream or Possibility?" is an attempt to analyze the post-war trend toward integration by the nations of Western Europe to determine whether any of the organizations that have resulted could lead to a political entity, a United States of Europe, capable of becoming a third power center between the United States and the Soviet Union. The method chosen to examine this trend is to review three major politico-military problems currently confronting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to determine whether the attempts by the Alliance partners to solve these problems were dictated by military necessity or by political expediency. The bedrock question is whether the perception of a common military threat and the subsequent reaction to the threat built toward a political union.

In the beginning of the post-war period, military necessity controlled the political situation. The United States, abandoning its traditional position of no entangling alliances during peacetime, a policy which had been inherited from Washington's day, embarked on an orgy of alliances. The impetus was the realization of the USSR threat to US security. The result was the US sponsorship of a series of European economic, political, and military alliances, each envision at inception as leading ultimately to political integration. Among the earliest ones, and one which has proven most durable, was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Europe's past history has illustrated the point that if the perception of a common military threat persisted over a long period of time, a solution to the attendant political problems would be forthcoming. The history of the Swiss Confederation is a case in point. In NATO it became apparent upon examination that the perception of the common military threat was of short duration. The Soviet threat became more subtle; the USSR established a parity with the United States when she discovered the secret of nuclear weapons; a "balance of terror" era came into being and under the "nuclear umbrella" Western Europe lapsed into its traditional political patterns. Nationalism is resurgent and, with its renaissance, the dreams of a common destiny are vanishing. The problem of continuing vigilance in the face of changing NATO strategies; of nuclear control, ownership, and development controversies; of the failure of the Alliance members to meet their commitments; and of the divisive effects of resurgent nationalism leads to one answer--there is no likelihood of a United States of Europe emerging as a third power in the world power balance during the next decade.

CHAPTER 1

THE DREAMS OF THE PAST

Dreams of a political union of various combinations of the nation-states of Europe have been woven through the fabric of her history from the twilight of the Middle Ages to the present day. These dreams reflected the influence of the classical world, especially Roman law; the imprint of Christianity; the unity achieved by the medieval Empire and the Papacy; the sense of solidarity in the notion of Crusading; post-medieval nostalgia for a past often misunderstood; the longing for perpetual peace; the imperialism of Napoleon; Romanticism and nationalism; international Socialism, federalism, and the growth of a European Trade union movement.¹ Almost all the proposals for international organization prior to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 were the visions of dreamers, theologians and philosophers rather than the concern of statesmen and soldiers. After 1815 the desire to maintain the status quo led to the creation of permanent institutions of cooperation to prevent the recurrence of another disaster like the French Revolution and Napoleonic empire. Europe was launched on a series of attempts to band together to serve its common interests. These attempts received a serious setback during the 1914-1918 period when war erupted in Europe and

¹Richard Mayne, The Community of Europe, p. 45.

eventually spread to the rest of the world. In the aftermath of the war, the dreams of regional European union were merged into the attempt at a world organization in the form of the League of Nations. What little progress the League was making toward maintenance of peace was completely arrested by the outbreak of World War II.

From the incubus of World War II came the trend toward regional integration which has as its goal the political union of Western Europe. Deprived by the war and its aftermath of the very tools needed to earn a living, the nations of Western Europe were too exhausted to embark on any solution to the problem of eliminating the causes of future wars. The specter of an empire building Soviet Russia haunted the Continent. The United States, realizing that improved technology had shrunk time and space factors to such a point that her security depended on a Western Europe free from Soviet domination, provided monetary aid for the economic recovery of Europe. With the aid went the stipulation that the economic unions should produce a considerable degree of political confederation. The trend toward integration was thus begun by the Americans and forwarded with some enthusiasm by the Europeans in the fields of economic, military, and political life.

CHAPTER 2

THE TREND TOWARD INTEGRATION

Before the Marshall Plan came into being, several incidents had taken place in the eastern Mediterranean area which made the United States realize that she would have to abandon her traditional isolationist role for a broader one in world affairs. The incidents, which involved the Soviet Union, Iran, Turkey, and Greece, occurred during 1946 and early 1947 and were essentially attempts to enhance USSR power in the eastern Mediterranean. By facing up to the Soviet Union, the United States learned that the Soviet Union was an enemy; that Great Britain was no longer able to play her historical role of balance of power; and that the United States would have to fill the power vacuum herself. On 12 March 1947 President Truman appealed to Congress to furnish financial and other assistance to Greece and Turkey saying:

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes impose upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way.¹

¹US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, North Atlantic Treaty, pp. 67-68 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, NATO").

THE MARSHALL PLAN

Within Western Europe the United States had to acknowledge that victor and vanquished alike were economically, militarily, morally, and spiritually in a state of collapse. The United States also knew that the eastern bastion of her own security system was Western Europe. At the 1947 Harvard University commencement address, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed that the United States give to Europe the economic assistance she needed to stimulate her economic recovery.² The Economic Cooperation Act of 3 April 1948, the so-called Marshall Plan, was the result; it has been described as "the boldest and most successful attempt ever made by any nation to lend its strength toward assisting the economic recovery of its friends."³

The Act created the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to administer the US part of the Marshall Plan. The 18 Western European countries involved created an administrative counterpart, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The OEEC is regarded as the first major step toward the economic integration of Europe, and much the same criticism and praise it was given was echoed later against the subsequent unions. Its detractors pointed out that the organization, composed as it was of

²George C. Marshall, "European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVI, 15 June 1947, pp. 1159-1160.

³Christian A. Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community, p. 16.

representatives of 18 European nations, lacked authority; that it did not produce a united European recovery plan; that its limited efforts to co-ordinate investments had small results; that economic union as such was no panacea for the political and social differences which had divided Europe from time immemorial; that because of the differences in the European viewpoint and practices in marketing, distribution, manufacturing, and tariff practices, movement toward what economic union there was was much slower than the United States wanted it to be; and, last but not least, that any organization that required unanimous votes for any decision was doomed from the start.

The pro-OEEC supporters felt that the OEEC had brought intra-European cooperation to a new high level; that it paved the way for an even higher degree of cooperation; that it commenced a progressive removal of quotas on trade as instruments of restraint of the movement of manufactured goods; that the European Payments Union which it created had financed trade, removed many bi-lateral restrictions on trade, stabilized currencies, and provided currency clearing arrangements; and, above all, that it taught the Europeans a sense of common interests and standards and developed the practice of economic cooperation among the states of the OEEC. Certainly this latter point was to come into play in the economic and military unions which came one upon the heels of the other in the few short years that were to follow.

While the OEEC was the forerunner of other regional attempts at economic integration, it continued to exist in its own right

until October 1961 when it was replaced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD carries on the old OEEC mission of fostering cooperation among its members to achieve economic growth and stability. It added the United States and Canada to its membership, as well as Yugoslavia in an observer role, giving it an Atlantic Community flavor which transcends its purely European role.

THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an economic union of France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries, was the first major attempt at economic union. The ECSC established a quasi-governmental organization to control the coal, steel, and iron ore resources of its member nations, to eliminate trade barriers on these products, and to achieve an expansion of production and trade in them.⁴

The formal organization of the ECSC was completed in September 1952. It was a supra-national structure with limited functions, but very real powers.⁵ The federal institutions which were created included a Common Assembly, a High Authority, and a Court of Justice. The Community structure was designed as a component to be built

⁴US Department of State, "The European Coal and Steel Community," American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, pp. 1039-1150.

⁵Use W. Kitzinger, The Politics and Economics of European Integration: British, European and United States, p. 12.

into a political framework at a later date.⁶ It was a significant step for European political union because six nations had voluntarily given up some of their prerogatives in certain economic areas to create federal institutions to govern their Community.

THE COMMON MARKET

The European Economic Community (EEC), popularly called the Common Market, and the European Atomic Community (EURATOM) were established simultaneously on 1 June 1958. With this move 449,000 square miles of territory and 170 million people were brought together in one economic unit. The Common Market's objective was an economic union, programed over a 12 to 15 year period, which would eliminate the tariffs and quota systems still hampering trade between the member nations. The EURATOM's objective was cooperation in the development and peaceful applications of atomic energy. The Treaty of Rome, which established EEC and EURATOM, required 248 articles, four annexes, 13 protocols, and four conventions to provide for restrictions on the movement of capital, labor, and services; to prohibit certain discriminatory trade practices; to outlaw subsidies, except for use in developing backward areas, as well as discriminatory taxes, price fixing, and the division of markets by cartels. The social aspects were not neglected and certain urgent needs to equalize hours and working conditions were enumerated. The European Investment Bank, the European Social

⁶Ibid.

Fund, and the Development Fund were created to accommodate the Common Market membership. Lastly, a common tariff against all non-members was to be established.⁷

The federal type organization of the ECSC was liberally adapted to suit the needs of the new organization. EEC emerged with a Commission to administer it, a Council of Ministers representing the rights of the nation-states, a European Parliament Assembly representing the electorate, and a High Court. As with all organizations, certain methods of operation not shown on the formal charts have appeared. One observer, noting this phenomena, wrote:

Thus the political system which has grown up about the EEC is extremely complex; much of it operates through channels not exposed to public scrutiny. In this system, the pressure groups appear to play a big role in articulating interests; and the Commission and the pressure groups (particularly the Monnet Committee) together are important in aggregating interests and initiating policy. The role of the European Parliamentary Assembly is a distinctly subordinate one; and this is not a very reassuring prospect for the future of parliamentary institutions within the Community.⁸

The Common Market's contributions to the economic and political union of the Western European powers have been considerable. The critics have been motivated by their pro-federalist

⁷Noble Frankland, ed., "Final Act by Inter-governmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom, Rome, 25 March 1957," Documents on International Affairs, pp. 450-452.

⁸Richard W. Cox, "The Study of European Institutions: Some Problems of Economic and Political Organization," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. III, Feb. 1965, p. 114.

or pro-nationalist viewpoints and their mental visual accuity has proportionately affected their judgment. The President of the Commission of the EEC, Doctor Walter Hallstein, defines the EEC from his parochial point of view as:

The European Community is neither producer nor trader, neither freight agent nor insurer, neither cooperative nor trade union. Economic integration is the merging of the policies of the six member countries, policies which determine the conditions of economic life. The European Economic Community is the first half of the 'Political Union' we hear so much about, the half concerned with domestic politics; it covers economic and social union.⁹

One of the most dispassionate appraisals was made by Congressman Christian A. Herter when he wrote in 1963:

The EEC is a more revolutionary development than either the Coal and Steel Community or EURATOM. Its eventual impact on the whole world will not be measured for many years to come, but its early successes and its influence in forcing the other great nations of the free world to review their own policies indicate the profound nature of its initial impact.¹⁰

THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA

The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) came into being on 20 November 1959 when Great Britain persuaded Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, and Switzerland to join her in a free trade area association. Like a custom's union, EFTA members have abolished trade barriers, but unlike a custom's union, have

⁹Walter Hallstein, "The Three Problems of European Integration," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 31, 15 May 1965, p. 459.

¹⁰Herter, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

retained individual external barriers. Several other features of the EFTA are different from the EEC--no common agricultural policy since agriculture is expressly excluded from the free trade area dealings; no specific provision for the freedom of movement of services and capital; and no provisions for the overseas associated countries or territories.¹¹ EFTA was apparently intended to be less a permanent arrangement than a counter for bargaining with EEC for a free trade area.¹²

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

The Council of Europe was established on 5 May 1949 as the political counterpart of the OEEC. It was an attempt at a purely European organization--of, by, and for Europeans--as opposed to NATO which was a step toward an Atlantic Community of certain nations of Europe and North America. It is categorized as purely political since, by charter, it has left all military matters in the hands of NATO and all its economic affairs in the hands of the Common Market. The significance of this organization is that it is one more signpost in the trend toward the integration of the nations of Western Europe since World War II. A study made by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund says of this phenomena:

¹¹Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

¹²Herter, op. cit., p. 23.

Discernable in many areas is a tendency for nations to involve some parts of themselves in different groupings and associations. Thus the Western European countries have for purposes of defense been part of an Atlantic community while for economic reasons they have been part of a European community These new communities carved out of the existing sovereignties have their own capitals, their own civil services. Such developments are bound to increase. We are on the threshold of what will undoubtedly be a vast and many sided institutional growth.¹³

The ground work for creating the Council was laid in May 1948 at a meeting at the Hague of some 750 Europeans, euphoniously labeled "The Congress of Europe." The meeting had been instigated by the International Committee on the Movement for European Unity and the attendees represented various schools of thought on how to obtain the union of Europe. There were two approaches to the problem of union--federation and confederation. Fundamentally, both camps agreed that in unity there was strength for Europe, but their differences developed on the way to attain the desired state. The federalists advocated the establishment of federal institutions such as an European Assembly at which all the peoples of Europe would be represented, a European Court of Human Rights, and other necessary governing agencies to perform the functions of a supra-national government. They reasoned that those in favor of this approach should be allowed to proceed with it at once; other states, upon seeing the error of their ways, could join at

¹³Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., Special Studies Project Report I, The Mid-century Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 51.

their own initiative. Initially, France and Belgium were in the vanguard of this group. Within the federalist, a group, labeled the functionalists, wanted to take the erection of a federal supranational organization step by step. Great Britain, ever mindful of her role in the British Commonwealth, led this party and was supported by the Scandinavian countries.

The other camp, the advocates of confederation, envisioned what de Gaulle, subsequently moving France out of the federalist camp, called a Europe of Fatherlands. Essentially, it is a loose type of confederacy in which the states do not surrender sovereignty. Since there is no pooling of sovereignty, this concept builds on a foundation of voluntary cooperation among the several nation-states.

The United States had no role in the deliberations, strictly speaking; nevertheless, she had a vital interest in the outcome since she was a military partner in NATO and an economic partner with each of the nations on a bilateral basis.

The committee appointed by the Brussels Treaty Organization in October 1948 to study the European union problem came up with a compromise solution which sought to reconcile the differences between the federalists and the confederationists. The committee recommended that a Council of Europe be established, consisting of a Consultative Assembly and a Council of Ministers. In execution, the Council of Europe was not truly a federal institution. The Consultative Assembly members were selected by the legislatures of

their own countries in any manner which they desired. The Assembly could make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers which in turn could communicate them to the member governments. Only unanimously approved recommendations are forwarded through the chain. With such a screening process, the Council of Europe is unable to count any accomplishments to its credit; little attention is paid to its deliberations in spite of its attempts to mold itself into a European Parliament exercising a firm control over the Committee of Ministers which was supposed to be the international executive agency of the Council.

As a political alliance, the Council of Europe has been unable to influence its members to abandon their traditional prerogatives as nation-states. Nationalism as a political entity struggled so long to become a force in the power dynamics of Europe that it is still too strong to be written off as a thing of the past.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The Western European Union (WEU) was conceived, incubated, and born between the fateful 30 August 1954 when the French Chamber of Deputies repudiated the European Defense Community Treaty and 23 October 1954, the date on which the Brussels Treaty was signed. The urgency to introduce German forces into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was based on a realization that the whole basis of NATO strategy and, to a lesser degree, of European

integration were in jeopardy. When France renigged, Great Britain stepped forward with the solution which would accomplish the creation of a stronger Western Europe.

The catalyst which was used to resolve the dilemma and to bring Germany into NATO was the Brussels Treaty to which NATO traced its origins. The Brussels Treaty Organization was enlarged to include Germany and Italy and renamed the Western European Union. WEU was not an alliance in the traditional sense since all military aspects fell within the purview of NATO. WEU's role was to channel West Germany's troops into NATO and at the same time to supervise a set of nuclear armament controls over West Germany which were similar to ones set forth in the repudiated European Defense Community Treaty. Its greatest significance was that it added flesh and muscle to the existing military framework of NATO.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is first and foremost a regional defensive military alliance. The authors of the 1949 treaty foresaw collateral development in the political and economic fields; Article 2 says in part,

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions . . . and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.¹⁴

¹⁴Congress, NATO, p. 1.

NATO traces its ancestry to the Dunkirk Treaty of 4 March 1947, a mutual defense pact between Great Britain and France against the adoption by Germany of a policy of aggression.¹⁵ On 17 March 1948 the next generation in the development came into being with the signature of the Brussels Treaty. The Benelux countries, together with Great Britain and France, signed a significant document whose full value was not to be realized until somewhat later in history, but which was the basis for future collaboration in economic, social, cultural, and collective self defense matters. In the United States, the Senate voted 64 to 4 to adopt the Vandenberg Resolution, a resolution reaffirming the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations and through the "association of the United States . . . with such regional . . . arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self help and mutual aid"¹⁶ The United States had abandoned its historic policy of non-alignment with foreign nations in time of peace. Both sides of the Atlantic were now ready for the alliance and on 4 April 1949 in Washington twelve nations signed the historic North Atlantic Treaty which embodied in its Article 5 the precedent setting principle that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."¹⁷ The United States was happy that her first line of defense was to be organized into a

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 58-60.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 2.

viable entity. Europe was happy with the idea of United States support before a war broke out; she had grown apathetic to the idea of being liberated after being overrun and subjected to the indignities of USSR occupation.

The positive results attributable to the Alliance can be summed up by saying that, militarily, it has preserved the peace and created a "unified defense system based on the combination of the shield which covers Europe and the strategic nuclear weapon."¹⁸ More specifically, NATO can claim success because it has deterred the Soviet Union from annexing Western Europe, it has created a viable infrastructure program, and it has drawn a revitalized and dynamic Germany into the orbit of Western Europe.

¹⁸North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Handbook, p. 8.

CHAPTER 3

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 because Western Europe and the United States perceived a common military threat in the empire building campaign on which the Soviet Union had embarked in the immediate post-World War II era. The Baltic countries and parts of Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany had disappeared into the jaws of the Russian bear at the war's end. The Iranian, Turkish, and Greek areas were under fire in 1946-47 with the obvious purpose of bringing them into the USSR's orbit. By February 1948 all of Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were under USSR domination. In 1949 there was the Berlin Blockade. Russia's position was truly awesome: 23 bilateral treaties existed between the Soviet Union and her satellites; the Cominform was busily pursuing its primary mission of trying to destroy the political systems of the western world; there was a USSR military machine which could field some 200 divisions on call; and the United Nations was floundering under the barrage of USSR vetoes and other parliamentary tactics. Out of this political situation NATO emerged.

The development of NATO has been characterized by the creation of the NATO machinery and the organization of the common defense. The NATO machinery includes the North Atlantic Council which, as NATO's highest authority, meets continuously to discuss the

organization's daily problems. The integrated command structure which operates from Paris has been developed. The military organization to which member nations have contributed units of various sizes and conformations made its appearance. In organizing the common defense, the strategic concept of the integrated defense on the Elbe River was developed, the nuclear deterrent to be supplied by the United States. Germany, Italy, and Turkey were added to NATO and Germany's troops were introduced into the NATO forces. A significant decision was made to stockpile nuclear weapons in Europe: this has had extensions in the strategic field as endless discussions ensued on the "circumstances in which the Alliance might have to have recourse to nuclear weapons."¹ The strategic concept of the flexible response is currently under examination by the allies to determine its role in NATO's future strategy.

NATO's development has been made against a background of continuing political and military problems, examination of which reveals that the perception of the common military threat has changed so rapidly that NATO has made no lasting contribution to the solution of the political problem of Western European unification. The most significant of these military-political problems are the military strategy of NATO; nuclear control, ownership, and deployment; and the failure of the allies to meet their troop commitments

¹North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Handbook, p. 18 (referred to hereafter as "NATO, Handbook").

as defined under NATO strategic concepts.

NATO STRATEGY

The evolution of the military strategy of NATO has been a complex one marked by the emergence of three major strategic concepts. The first one, the strategy of massive retaliation, appeared when NATO became effective on 24 August 1949. The United States enjoyed a monopoly of atomic weapons and, consequently, the delineation of the common defense policy hinged on her decisions. The concept which was evolved for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area was based on a strategy of deterrence in which it was assumed that the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) would, in case of war, completely destroy the USSR with atomic bombs. The assumptions on which this strategy was based envisioned a total war between the Soviet Union and the West to be initiated by the USSR, air delivery of the atomic weapon by SAC, and a US weapon of such potency that no one would dare challenge its owner or his friends for fear of retaliatory annihilation.

The second major strategic concept, the so-called "forward strategy," soon appeared as the result of two major events--the detonation of the first USSR atomic weapon in 1949 and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950. Impetus for the revision of NATO strategy came from the European powers who began to doubt the efficacy of the US weapon and strategy. "Allied collaboration can flourish and perform its vital military and political functions only if it

proceeds from a continued adjustment of military strategy to meet the changing requirements of allied security and cohesion," observed the experts.² The planners, both military and political, met and developed the concept that aggression must be met as close to its source as possible in order to permit defense of the maximum number of the Alliance's countries. It is noteworthy that when debate on this strategy began, it was proposed that the allied troops would withdraw from the Elbe River under USSR pressure and the vacated area would then be bombed with atomic weapons. The forward strategy as finally adopted in September 1950 established the Elbe River as the forward line of NATO's defense.

The ground forces for the forward strategy were to have a dual function--to act as a "tripwire" and to be the "shield" for NATO. The NATO forces were to keep the USSR forces at bay on the Elbe River long enough for SAC to eliminate the USSR homeland. The tripwire and shield concept necessitated more troops, but with the Korean War in progress, a source for additional troops became a problem of the first magnitude, both from the military and the political standpoint.

It was during this period that the ill-fated European Defense Community was conceived. The United States had offered the obvious solution to the problem of where to recruit additional manpower--Germany could provide the 12 divisions needed for the defense of the European front. France refused to consent to the reestablishment of

²Robert E. Osgood, NATO, The Entangling Alliance, p. 354.

a German Wehrmacht or to German membership in NATO, as the United States wanted. Germany stated that if she were to be permitted to raise an army, she would want an equal voice in all matters germane to the problem. The European Defense Community Treaty embodied a compromise of the three positions by creating a European army to which each state would contribute its forces, all to be equally under joint European control.³ When France in August 1954 still would not reconcile herself to Germany, the EDC failed.

In October of the same year France signed the treaty creating the Western European Union. This act gave NATO the troops which her strategic plans required for her to become a viable shield. As a guarantee of good faith, the United States pledged to retain US forces on the European continent as long as necessary.⁴

In December 1957 a defense policy which strengthened the forward strategy was announced by the Atlantic Council in Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the ministers at the conclusion of the first meeting in which the heads of state of the member governments had participated.

20. . . . NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate-range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

³Uwe W. Kitzinger, The Politics and Economics of European Integration: British, European and United States, p. 14.

⁴Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the President of the United States 1955, pp. 324-328.

21. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defence plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned.⁵

Nuclear warheads on the Continent added one more muscle to the NATO deterrent.

By 1961 the third major strategic concept, the flexible response, appeared. The United States proclaimed that situations could arise in which a conventional attack on a NATO member would not automatically be met with a nuclear response, but, if possible, with conventional means. The concept was built on the idea that one way of insuring an effective conventional defense and at the same time limiting the US requirement for general purpose forces was by the maintenance and support of strong allied capabilities. Europe had the population and the money to provide that strong conventional capability. Therefore, the strategy which evolved envisioned strong European conventional forces joined with those of the United States to free European defenses from their sole reliance on nuclear deterrence. European response to the US strategy was less than enthusiastic; some Europeans expressed doubts about US willingness to use nuclear weapons in any cases where her own vital interests were not involved while some contended that the United States would abandon her European allies. Since an increase in conventional forces entailed an increase in the cost of the defense establishments

⁵NATO, Handbook, p. 79.

of the various allies, another divisive factor was added. In the intervening years agreement has not been reached on what the force level for the conventional forces should be, or even whether NATO strategy should be changed to accommodate the US concept. Mr. Dirk M. Stikker, former Secretary General of NATO, characterized the 1965 NATO strategy as follows:

Present NATO strategy is based de facto on three principles: Flexibility--the capability to respond to any kind of attack with appropriate means; a forward concept--defense should be as near to the borders of NATO territories as possible; and integration of the armed forces of its members.⁶

Resolution of this impasse between the de facto strategy of flexible response and the official strategy of massive retaliation is required immediately in order to work out a new NATO defense concept based on the current perception of the common military threat. Without a solution the viability of the North Atlantic military alliance is threatened with dissolution.

THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM

The problem of nuclear control, ownership and deployment is another potent political problem confronting NATO today. It has been generated by the desire of the European members of NATO for more access to planning and policy decisions for the employment of nuclear weapons. Under the banner of preventing nuclear

⁶Dirk M. Stikker, "NATO--The Shifting Western Alliance," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1965, p. 11.

proliferation it has rocked the Alliance to its foundation and a solution is eagerly sought by all the NATO partners. Political considerations have prevented a solution to a basically military problem.

The Europeans consider themselves on the horns of a dilemma. One group has expressed concern that the United States might hesitate to use its nuclear weapons in case of an attack not directly aimed at it. The other group has expressed concern that the United States would use nuclear weapons prematurely, particularly because the conventional arm of NATO has not been sufficiently developed.⁷ A solution has been sought in an independent nuclear deterrent in the hands of the Europeans.

The dilemma was triggered in October 1957 when the Russians orbited their first satellite. To the European members of NATO it seemed that the United States was now vulnerable to USSR attack and counter-retaliation, a psychological blow to the European sense of security which had been nurtured on a reliance on the US theory of nuclear massive retaliation. They made an "agonizing reappraisal" and decided, with growing conviction, that the US nuclear striking force was a rather unreliable basis for their security. The agonizing was heightened by a division within the ranks of the European allies as several of them advanced various

⁷Kurt Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Community, pp. 16-18.

reasons for not acquiring their own nuclear capability:

1. To avoid the great expense and technological effort required, even with American assistance, to develop, produce, and maintain an adequate quantity and quality of nuclear weapons.
2. To avoid the increased danger of attracting a Soviet nuclear attack.
3. To avoid stimulating the spread of nuclear capabilities and thereby increasing the hazards of joining the nuclear club by impeding disarmament, unstabilizing the military environment, and undermining allied collaboration while reducing the benefits by diffusing them to other members.
4. To avoid contravening a domestic moral and emotional aversion to owning and producing nuclear weapons.⁸

To England, France, and Germany, each of whom has enough wealth and industrial capability to venture into membership in the "nuclear club," the rationale for acquiring a nuclear capability is couched in many different forms. The basic reason, however, has been that possession of the weapon gives its owner a lever for "enhancing bargaining power and influence vis-a-vis the United States and other allies in matters of foreign policy, military strategy, and disarmament."⁹

The proliferation of nuclear weapons began with the British. Because of common bonds based on the US's British heritage, a partnership has grown up which Great Britain has taken great pains to foster and which is obviously effective since de Gaulle has derisively labeled it a unity of the Anglo-Saxons. The British have received

⁸Osgood, op. cit., p. 260.

⁹Ibid.

both information and material assistance; the result is that their nuclear power and their potential have been a successful lever to catapult Great Britain into the position of the third member of the "nuclear club."

France also demanded an independent nuclear force. In order to attain this great power status, France began its campaign in the aftermath of the Suez Canal crisis. De Gaulle played up the idea that the United States would not support Europe in a crisis unless her vital interests were at stake. The United States has pursued a tactic of not proffering France any help. The result has been that the United States has been able only to block French progress, but not halt it. Within France's own limited means, she has continued to plod through the step by step development of her force de frappe. It is doubtful whether, even in the short run, possession of strategic weapons will give her greater security or status.

Germany has begun agitation for a voice in the solution of the nuclear problem. She makes her bid from a position of strength. Even though specifically prohibited from manufacturing nuclear weapons by the Paris Agreements, she has backdoor access to nuclear technology. In 1957 France, with knowledge gained from her own nuclear experiments, moved toward an agreement with the EEC and EURATOM on the peaceful uses of nuclear power. Germany, as a partner to both unions, was to have access to all the techniques and results obtained from the technological development of peaceful

atomic power. Since peaceful uses and military uses go hand in hand, Germany, as the most powerful industrial and military member of the Alliance in Europe, could become a nuclear power overnight. The Germans, while protesting they have no grounds for rescinding their pledge, have a lever to force themselves into membership in the "nuclear club" in spite of France's opposition to nuclear weapons for Germany. Chancellor Erhard, in a talk with a group of journalists on 14 December 1965, put Germany's case rather succinctly when he said, "One cannot discriminate against us only because we are a divided country."¹⁰

What is the answer to the question of nuclear control? The United States is pressed to permit her allies to share various phases of the planning, policy formation, and decision-making processes. Varying degrees of integration of the European members of NATO into the planning phase, the operational control phase, or the execution phase have been advocated by various members of the Alliance. Further, it has been suggested that all the allies participate while some say that only the major ones should. The United States recognizes the legitimacy of some of the demands presses upon her by her allies, and even desires or needs to accommodate them. However, the United States is confronted with the dilemma created by this desire on the one hand and the requirements

¹⁰"Rusk Tells NATO: Asian War Yours," New York Times, 15 Dec. 1965, p. 1.

for centralized control dictated both by strategic concepts and the law of the land on the other.¹¹ The original Atomic Energy Act of 1946 attempted to protect the US's atomic monopoly; in 1954 it was amended and liberalized to the extent that the Department of Defense was given atomic weapons for such use as the Secretary of Defense deemed to be in the national interest. However, he could not give the weapons to an ally for training except under the continual custody of US nationals.¹²

In 1960 the United States endeavored once more to arrive at a solution to the pressing nuclear problem by advocating the Multilateral Force (MLF). The US military viewpoint, expressed in its basic terms, was:

. . . there was no direct security advantage to be gained by relinquishing custody of nuclear warheads and giving the allies a larger share of their control. On the contrary, sharing nuclear custody and control would complicate the problem of the politically disciplined and responsible employment of nuclear weapons and, possibly, reduce the credibility of nuclear retaliation.¹³

The MLF was a solution offered for political reasons. It was a solution not founded on military need and it added nothing significant to current military capabilities. The whole project was plagued with obstacles and indifference from the allies whose attitude was summed up by one French document which referred to

¹¹Theo Sommer, "For An Atlantic Future," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Oct. 1964, pp. 117-118.

¹²US Congress, "Atomic Energy Act of 1954," US Code 1954, pp. 1076-1127.

¹³Osgood, op. cit., p. 276.

MLF as "an American controlled illusion of equality--equality on the basis of the rabbit pie made of one horse, one rabbit."¹⁴ The MLF is currently in limbo without having been officially declared a closed issue.

Whatever military or political solution emerges from the talks yet ahead on the nuclear problem, one basic factor remains--as long as US power continues to be the deterrent which keeps the Soviet Union in check, Europe needs US collaboration to maintain the peace, or what approximates it in our time. The US nuclear policy was reaffirmed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at the 1966 House hearings on defense appropriations:

Furthermore, any such agreement we enter into must reinforce our basic policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, i.e., the consent of the United States must be obtained prior to the firing of nuclear weapons. If, however, the major nations of Europe some day achieve political unity with a central political authority capable of making the decision to use nuclear weapons, the United States recognizes that this will create a new situation in which it would be appropriate to reconsider any agreement which might be made under the present circumstances.¹⁵

FAILURE TO MEET COMMITMENTS

Another military problem, whose solution is imbedded in political considerations, stems from the failure of the allies to meet their troop commitments as defined under NATO strategic concepts.

¹⁴Murray Marder, "NATO Is Target For Parliamentarians," Washington Post, 7 Oct. 1965, p. A19.

¹⁵Robert S. McNamara, United States Defense Policies in 1964, p. 59.

In order to determine what the contribution of each member will be in terms of men, armament, and money, a system of Triennial Review was established in 1962 to replace an Annual Review formerly in force. The coordination of the defense effort is predicated on the reconciliation of the defense needs as determined by the envisioned military threat with the political, economic, and financial capabilities of the members. A proportional cost for each member is then determined. Since the review process entails a thorough analysis of each state's forces, future defense plans, and financial and economic plans, a considerable degree of national autonomy is involved, a touchy subject in itself. Basic to any decisions made at the Triennial Review is the necessity of reconciling the force requirements with the requirements of the accepted strategy. Therein lies the greatest sources of irritation, for while European NATO partners continue to regard the strategy of massive retaliation as paramount, the United States has revised that strategy to include the flexible response.

The theory of flexible response envisions a response geared to the threat offered. Conventional forces, therefore, assume a greater importance than under the massive retaliation strategy since parity must exist between the USSR ground troops comprising a conventional threat and NATO defense troops. Much time has been spent in determining what size the conventional forces of NATO should be. Under agreements reached by all NATO members before the appearance of the flexible response strategy, a standing force

of 30 divisions was agreed upon. The United States contends that 30 divisions are still required. Her insistence that NATO give first priority to building those conventional forces has only aggravated the Europeans who contend that the USSR would be more effectively deterred if they knew that the United States had no alternative to instant nuclear retaliation. They expostulate that fighting a conventional war against an aggressor with a nuclear capability requires the same deployment used in fighting a nuclear war. Since this type of mobile war means an offensive defense, the number of defense units must match the number of offense units. Therefore, 30 NATO divisions can cope with only 30 aggressor divisions.¹⁶ If the number of NATO divisions is reduced, NATO's effective conventional force is reduced proportionately. It is readily apparent why Europeans view with alarm the changed theory on strategy since, by German reckoning, the USSR has a total of 76 divisions readily available for a thrust with a capability of quickly mustering 70 to 75 more. Even given enough time, the NATO members could field only 81 divisions against the USSR's 208 divisions, of which 120 are presently at 70% of their wartime strength.¹⁷

The most publicized failure to meet NATO troop commitments has been that of France. Four divisions of ground troops, plus other

¹⁶Otto Heilbrunn, "NATO and the Flexible Response," Military Review, May 1965, pp. 22-26.

¹⁷Gen. Hans Speidel, "The Defense of Europe," Military Review, May 1965, pp. 27-32.

air and sea units, were initially assigned to the NATO structure; two ground divisions were withdrawn at the height of the Algerian crises; in 1959 the French Mediterranean fleet was removed, and, more recently, virtually all France's Atlantic naval forces have followed suit.

The British contribution has been slowly eroded and it seems from Prime Minister Wilson's recent cutbacks on national defense that still more British troops will be withdrawn.

The smaller countries are not without blame in this area either, the Benelux and Scandinavian countries being below their quotas.

While Germany has not reneged on her commitments, there is a gnawing fear of what could happen to the Alliance if she should. Professor Hans J. Morgenthau noted the politics implicit in this situation when he commented:

The tension between the German Commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and the national goal of unification, to be achieved only with Russian consent, inevitably raises in German minds the question of whether that commitment and this objective are truly compatible and whether the former must not be sacrificed in order to achieve the latter. The logic of the argument implicit in this question can be prevented from becoming the rationale of the actual policy of Germany only by the intransigence of Russian, and the wisdom of American, policies.¹⁸

Thus, the reluctance of the European NATO allies to meet their commitments turns on their reluctance to accept the strategy of flexible response which to them undermines the automatic US

¹⁸Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," Alliance Policy In the Cold War (edited by Arnold O. Wolfers), p. 208.

nuclear response. The Europeans' dilemma is further aggravated because their appraisal and reaction to the flexible response strategy is hopelessly entwined with aspirations for ownership, control, and development of nuclear weapons. Further, the relaxation of tension in Europe, engendered by a sense of security bred of the success of NATO as a military pact, has spawned a school of thought which propounds the thesis that a major nuclear war would be "unthinkable" and, consequently, relegates a threat from nuclear weapons to the category of just another means of bluff and blackmail among nations.¹⁹ One former NATO Secretary General declared that "the balance of nuclear terror has now reached a stage where nobody can start a war."²⁰ Mr. Brosio, the current NATO Secretary General, gave that comment added meaning when he said:

There is a dangerous illusion in some European countries which believe that under the protection of the Soviet-American nuclear stalemate, they can pursue a policy entirely independent of, and indeed contrary to, that of the other Allies.²¹

In short, within an atmosphere somewhat freed of the specter of immediate annihilation, the members of the Alliance have lost their cementing challenge.²²

¹⁹George Liska, Nations In Alliance, p. 9.

²⁰Stikker, op. cit., p. 11.

²¹Marder, op. cit., p. A19.

²²Sommer, op. cit., p. 117.

CHAPTER 4

THE DREAM VANISHES

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has not proved to be the instrument with which to create a United States of Europe as a European partner for the United States in the North Atlantic Community. Upon the initial perception of a common danger in the late 1940's, military considerations controlled the political situation. The conclusion of the Korean War signaled the end of that era and the beginning of an era marked by the control of the military situation by political considerations. The bonds of NATO were slowly loosened. The catalyst for this transformation was the renaissance of European nationalism.

The divisive effect of resurgent nationalism is exemplified by France's "gaullism." It has been defined as:

. . . an effort to construct a particular kind of European entity marked by the impress of French leadership, capable of evolving a common policy different in many matters from the United States policy, and with a clear European identity (not the Atlantic identity the United States wants) forged on the basis of a certain separation from the exterior world.¹

The President of France has set a course which has been the despair of his NATO allies. However, the extent of his support within France indicates that he is backed by a large proportion of

¹Alan Overstreet, "The Nature and Prospects of European Integration," Journal of Common Market Studies, Feb. 1965, p. 129.

responsible French statesmen and politicians, as well as by the electorate which returned him to office in the 5 December 1965 election with 45% of their votes. He is a dynamic leader and he exerts a vital and important influence over his people.

De Gaulle's desire to construct a European entity with France as its leader was blueprinted in his memories which were published in 1959. He wrote:

Ensure security by preventing the birth of a new Reich. Maintain contacts with both East and West, if necessary making alliances on either side without ever accepting any kind of dependence Lead the states bordering on the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrennes, to unite politically, economically, and strategically. Create out of this entity the third planetary power, and if necessary, become one day the arbiter between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet camp.²

In order to impress French leadership on Europe, de Gaulle has taken a series of actions to repudiate all efforts aimed at the political unification of Europe on a supra-national pattern. He has frequently denounced the Treaty of Rome. At his twelfth press conference on 9 September 1965, he blasted the three treaties which set up ECSC, EURATOM, and the Common Market, the organizational structure of the EEC, the majority vote procedure to be effective in the EEC on 1 January 1966, and the attempts to subordinate French nationalism to European supra-nationalism and Europe to the United States.³

²Charles de Gaulle, as quoted by James Gavin, "On Dealing With De Gaulle," Atlantic, Vol. 215, Jun. 1965, pp. 49-54.

³Charles de Gaulle, "President de Gaulle Holds Twelfth Press Conference," Ambassade de France, pp. 3-7.

Supra-nationalism must go! De Gaulle's heir presumptive, Georges Pompidou, has given voice to de Gaulle's thoughts on blocking the emergence of a United States of Europe which is not French founded and guided. In an address to the French National Assembly on 17 June 1965, Pompidou said:

Certainly we do not believe in integration as a method of approach to European unity, precisely because we believe that there can be no real integration by setting up a European State, that no major decision involving the lives of men can be taken except by a political authority responsible to those involved, and that the transfer of governmental powers to commissioners of civil servants is disastrous.⁴

Professor Stanley Hoffmann, writing in the Journal of Common Market Studies, contends that de Gaulle's opposition to political union is based on three main reasons:

First, his concern for the substance of European policies leads him to refuse a procedure which may produce policies opposite to those he wants for Europe because he may not be able to exert sufficient control over the direction Secondly, he is convinced that in matters of vital interest for the states (such as diplomacy and strategy) majority rule is totally unrealistic Thirdly, he believes that for all its weaknesses the independent nation-state that pursues its policies is highly preferable to the nation 'integrated' in an entity whose policies serve primarily the interests of others.⁵

Thus it follows that de Gaulle "rejects supra-nationality because he thinks that it cannot work, and because he is afraid that if it

⁴Georges Pompidou, "France: The Real Europe," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Fall 1965, pp. 326-327.

⁵Stanley Hoffmann, "The European Process at Atlantic Cross Purposes," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. III, Feb. 1965, p. 95.

works at all it would go against the policies he wants for France and Europe."⁶

To loosen ties between the United States and Europe, de Gaulle's basic policy has been to reduce US influence in the military, political, and economic fields. He has railed against US sponsorship of European union; witness his 27 April 1965 radio and TV speech in which he said:

Others say . . . that we must also become absorbed into an Atlantic system, within which our defense, our economy and our commitments would necessarily depend on the American's weapons, material hold and policy. We have resisted the sirens of surrender.⁷

British nationalism has contributed its part to the failure of a United States of Europe to emerge during the current trend toward unions. Great Britain has for generations played the role of the balance of power in European politics. Simultaneously, she developed her overseas empire which gave her the financial status to be a leading European power. With the transformation of her empire into a commonwealth whose bonds are chiefly the favorable trade relations the member countries enjoy with each other, she has suffered a proportionate decline in her ability to influence her Continental neighbors. Her long association with the United States in the status of a privileged partner has further reduced her influence with her fellow Europeans. In essence, her problem

⁶Ibid.

⁷Charles de Gaulle, "Address Delivered by General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic over French Radio and TV on April 27, 1965," Ambassade de France, pp. 1-4.

is to decide whether or not to be European and while her dilemma lasts she will exert a diversion influence on European union.

The special British-United States relationship as it is today began in World War II and has continued throughout the post-war period. While Sir Winston Churchill is given credit by the Eurocrats for being the godfather of the current moves toward a United States of Europe and his Zurich speech in 1946 is cited as the source for the movements, the British concern was not for a European union of which they would be a part.⁸ In the intervening years they have reiterated this policy by remaining outside of the exclusively European organizations to which the United States did not commit any of its power. Thus, Great Britain was or is a member of the OEEC, NATO, the Brussels Pact and WEU. This stand has often put her in a delicate position because the United States has vigorously advocated that the road to political union was inexorably tied to successful economic union. Even when US economic interests were vitally affected by the formation and expansion of the Common Market, she backed it because she felt that substantial political gains would be made which would justify her position.⁹ Great Britain, under US urging, made one unsuccessful attempt to join the EEC and was humiliatingly rejected by France's veto.

⁸Andrew and Francis Bond, A United States of Europe, pp. 109-110.

⁹Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe, p. 102.

The case, and the problem, of Great Britain is the most telling argument against European federalization. There is so little accord between France and Great Britain, two of the three big regional powers, that they are unable to enter an economic union together. A political union which would demand even greater sacrifice of self-interest and self-government seems to be out of the question.

The problem of German reunification presents another facet of resurgent nationalism. As low keyed as gaullism is high keyed, it is equally demanding of a solution since the "capture of Germany is the key to the domination of all Europe, and West Germany, next to the United States, is the greatest single national obstacle to the Soviet ambition in the world as well as the greatest potential asset."¹⁰ Ancillary to the problem and its solution has been the difficulty of getting the Western German nation into the fold of the West in face of the almost paranoiac fear that France feels for a nation that defeated her three times within 75 years. Today Germany exists as a divided nation and the great question is when will the growing giant that is the Federal Republic of Germany try to effect a reunification of its homeland.

In the negotiations of the ill-fated EDC and in the Paris Agreements which established West Germany, the allies reserved the

¹⁰Robert E. Osgood, NATO, The Entangling Alliance, p. 324.

exclusive right to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the question of German reunification. In turn, Germany pledged that she would not undertake any forceful means of reuniting the two Germanys.¹¹ At the time of these agreements, Germany was not particularly concerned with the problem of reunification; the German people had devoted the immediate post-war era to keeping alive; later there was a period of earning a living, an effort which resulted in what journalists of the era called the miracle of German economic recovery. Little time or inclination was left over to devote to the problem of a unified Reich. The energy devoted to the economic field was fostered by the German government under Dr. Conrad Adenauer as an outlet and a compensation for any manifestation of nationalism which could have led to agitation for reunification. Uwe W. Kitzinger, the editor of the Journal of Common Market Studies, rationalized the situation in 1963 as follows:

The Germans lost their fatherland in a sense that no other country had. It was morally discredited, geographically divided, and physically shattered. The escape forward into a united Europe was the sole secular ideal that remained to German youth. What for the rest of Europe was the problem of controlling Germany was for the Germans the problem of working their way back to equal membership in the European family of nations.¹²

¹¹Peter V. Curl, ed., "The Paris Conference (October 20-23, 1954), Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954, pp. 125-182.

¹²Uwe W. Kitzinger, The Politics and Economics of European Integration: British, European and United States, p. 124.

The climate of the times has changed and the battle the Germans fought for acceptance has been accomplished to a remarkable degree. In the spring of 1965, well before the German September elections, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in anticipation of the resurrection of the unification issue, made the following statement:

The enforced division of Germany stands in the way of lasting peace. We seek common Atlantic policies in support of peaceful self determination for the German people.

We and our European allies seek closer contacts with the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union not to confirm the status quo but to bring about an enduring settlement in Central Europe. The United States is continuing to discuss . . . ways and means of working toward that goal in the interests of European security and the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of the German people to shape their own destiny.¹³

The reelection of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard in September 1965 has given an aura of suspense to the reunification problem. Naturally, he is expected to use the issue as a lever to extract concessions for his country in dealings with the rest of his Atlantic partners. The concensus of informed observers indicates that he should be the champion of European integration and the leader of the opposition to de Gaulle's efforts to undo the European unity movement. One US political reporter observed that

¹³Dean Rusk, "Our Atlantic Policy," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 22 Mar. 1965, p. 430.

"Erhard's Germany has become for us both a powerful and a sensibly restrained counterweight to the increasingly arrogant efforts of President de Gaulle to isolate us from Europe."¹⁴

France, as the aspiring spokesman for Europe, has not left the problem of reunification unnoticed. Speaking at his eleventh press conference on 4 February 1964, de Gaulle said:

The German problem is, indeed, the European problem France, for her part, believes that this problem cannot be resolved except by Europe herself, because it is on the scale of the whole of Europe. This, ultimately, is the basic objective of France.¹⁵

Such a statement reiterates the direct challenge to the United States and to her European partners who champion the idea of a political union of the European nations.

The solution to the German problem lies in Moscow. East Germany was created and is maintained by the Soviet Union as a buffer state between herself and Europe. The USSR has persistently pushed for the West's recognition of her puppet because

. . . this would bolster the Communist regime, demoralize those who seek self-determination there and in the other satellites, end the free Germans' identification with their western ties, and make it apparent to the Germans and all other parties concerned that the Soviet Union has the sole power to grant and withhold this major national goal.¹⁶

¹⁴William S. White, "German Elections," Washington Post, 22 Sept. 1965, p. A26.

¹⁵Charles de Gaulle, "President de Gaulle Holds Eleventh Press Conference," Ambassade de France, 4 Feb. 1965, pp. 9-12.

¹⁶Osgood, op. cit., p. 325.

The West seeks to prevent the isolation of the Federal Republic which could lead to a bilateral treaty between the USSR and the West Germans. Such a move would destroy twenty years of Western effort to find a peaceful way to effect the reunion of the two Germanys.

A solution to political cooperation within NATO has been sought through the North Atlantic Council. The primary means of attaining political cooperation has been through a technique of mutual collaboration which covers the spectrum from the routine exchange of views to prior consultation to establish a common or coordinated policy. The habit of consultation generated an atmosphere of mutual understanding and unity of views--"it is clear that cooperation with other nations on a military level encourages West European countries to work closely among themselves and thus boosts the idea of European union."¹⁷ However, the entire process is voluntary and therein lies its weakness for there is no mechanism to compel compliance with the majority opinion; there is no supra-national organization to which allegiance has been sworn; and there is no judiciary to which appeals can be made. Missing from any formula for success is the will of the NATO nations to comply fully with their treaty obligations. Because the United States has had a major voice in the formulation and operation of NATO, the

¹⁷Harold C. Deutsch, The New Europe, The Common Market, and The United States, p. 14.

allies have come to rely heavily on her leadership. This has distorted their perspective with the result that too little consideration has been given to the common responsibilities of the Alliance members.¹⁸

Further, the Europeans, with the threat of Soviet aggression having assumed more subtle and diversified forms of military, economic, and political power and with a greater leisure resulting from their enhanced economic condition, have begun to wonder just what kind of a union they want for themselves and with the United States. Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau's analysis of the probable fate of the Atlantic Alliance, although written in 1959, is still a valid expression of the hopes of the proponents of a strong and viable NATO.

The common fear of communism, either as subversion from within or aggression from without, and the common dedication to the values of Western civilization are likely to remain stronger than the disruptive tendencies of divergent and incompatible interests and thus to keep the framework of the Atlantic Alliance in tact.¹⁹

The determination of the type of political union to be formed has not crystalized. The inability of the economic unions such as EEC and EFTA to formulate common policies for trade and tariff, to resolve their agricultural problem, and to establish a

¹⁸Osgood, op. cit., p. 278.

¹⁹Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," Alliance Policy in the Cold War (edited by Arnold O. Wolfers), p. 205.

European free trade area reveals a failure to reach agreement over long term objectives and to overcome the clashes of material interest among states.

The military union of NATO has not proved to be the vehicle for the solution of the political problem of unification. NATO's ability to function without France is currently being seriously challenged. The French-NATO disenchantment is impeding the effectiveness of the organization as a defense mechanism for the Atlantic Alliance. The unresolved military problems, whose solutions lie in the political arena, vitally concern US security. NATO cannot reach accord on the best method of maintaining vigilance against the common military threat in the face of uncertainty of the military strategy to be followed; of a solution to the consuming question of nuclear control, ownership and deployment; of the allied commitment of troops to NATO defense; and of the divisive effects of resurgent nationalism.

The future role of NATO is the subject of speculation. As far back as 1962, Osgood admirably summed up the most probable future course when he wrote:

NATO is and will remain, so far as one can foresee, a coalition of sovereign nations for the protection of a limited, though vital, core of identical security interests within a mass of convergent and divergent political interests. The effective collaboration of its members depends upon a degree of military independence, and, concomitantly, political independence that transcends the requirements of technical efficiency.²⁰

²⁰Osgood, op. cit., p. 360.

Europe has failed to convert her military union into a United States of Europe. The perception of the common military threat dissolved before a solution to the political problems could be reached. The overwhelming desire to reach a solution is absent and, like the unfilled dreams of the past, the contemporary dreams are evaporating. The Alliances of today will disappear, to be merged into other shapes dictated by the press of new military threats, new fears, and new hopes for the future of mankind.

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